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ARGUMENT 
I. STANFORD FULFILLED HIS $500,000.00 MAXIMUM GUARANTEE 
OBLIGATION WHERE HE, NOT SNOWMASS, PAID THE PARKS OVER 
$750,000.00 IN PAYMENTS AS SNOWMASS' GUARANTOR 
Stanford's $500,000.00 maximum guarantee liability was extinguished when he 
paid the Parks over $750,000.00 of his own money in fulfillment of his guarantee. The 
only relevant case law on this issue demonstrates that when a guarantor makes payment 
on his guarantee, the law obligates the lender to credit those payments towards the 
guarantor's guarantee. 
The Parks attempt to circumvent this rule by relying on cases which are 
inapplicable to this case; namely, cases which state that a guarantor is not entitled to 
dictate how a lender applies a borrower's payments. However this case does not involve 
a guarantor seeking to apply a borrower's payments to his guarantee but rather a 
guarantor seeking credit for his own payments. Accordingly, the Parks' arguments in 
support of the District Court's conclusion that Stanford was not entitled to a credit for his 
payments should be rejected. 
Moreover, the District Court also erred by failing to give Stanford credit for the 
payments he made to the Parks where the Parks knew the money they were receiving was 
from Stanford and not Snowmass. The Parks contend that there are no facts to support 
this contention. The Parks are mistaken. 
1 
In the District Court, Stanford stated that the Parks made demand on him as 
guarantor for payment once Snowmass missed its requisite payments. Moreover, 
Stanford made his payments directly to the Parks using personal checks or cashier's 
checks, not checks drawn on a Snowmass account. At the very least, these facts 
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact which should have precluded the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment. 
A. The District Court Should Have Given Stanford Credit For Over 
$750,000.00 In Payments He Made To The Parks As A 
Guarantor 
The only case cited in either of the parties' opening briefs which presents identical 
facts to those of this case is Monmouth Plumbing Supply Co. v. McDonald, 147 A. 627 
(N.J. 1929). As in this case, Monmouth Plumbing presented the question of whether a 
guarantor who makes payments exceeding his guarantee amount is liable to the lender for 
additional sums unpaid by the debtor. Id. at 627-628. In Monmouth Plumbing, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court held that a guarantor is discharged from any further liability on his 
guarantee when he personally makes payments exceeding his guarantee amount. Id. at 
628. Monmouth Plumbing is persuasive in this case because unlike the cases cited by the 
Parks, it involved the application of payments the guarantor made as opposed to payments 
the borrower made. 
In the Parks' opening brief they trot out the same cases they cited in the court 
below; namely, Lee v. Yano, 997 P.2d 68 (Hawaii Ct. App. 2000), Wyandotte Coal & 
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Lime Co. v. Wyandotte Pav. & Constr. Co., 154 P. 1012 (Kansas 1916), and Standard 
Accident Ins. Co. v. Copper Hills Motor Hotels, Inc., 424 P.2d 154 (Ariz 1967). The 
Parks cite these cases for the general proposition that a guarantor cannot control the 
application of a payment a borrower made to a lender and contend that this rule is 
controlling in this case. (Appellees' Op. Br. at 14-15.) However, what the Parks fail to 
acknowledge to this Court is that those cases involve guarantors seeking to direct the 
application of payments the borrowers made, rather than payments the guarantors made. 
This factual difference is integral to the determination of this appeal and distinguishes this 
case from those on which the Parks rely. 
In Yano, an ex-husband had two separate debts with the plaintiff and gave a 
promissory note, guaranteed by Francis Yano ("Yano"), which promised to pay the 
plaintiff on one of those debts. Id. The ex-husband made some payments but eventually 
failed in his obligations and the plaintiff brought an action seeking payment from Yano as 
the guarantor on her ex-husband's note. Id. The plaintiff did not apply any of her ex-
husband's payments towards the note, but rather applied them to his other debts. Id-
The Hawaii Supreme Court noted that in the case of a debtor and creditor *c[i]t is 
elementary that in the absence of agreement and in the absence of direction from the 
borrower, the creditor may apply payments to any obligation he holds. Equally clear, if 
there be no provision to the contrary, the debtor may designate the application of payment 
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and the creditor must comply with such direction." Id. quoting Reconstruction Finance 
Corp. v. McCormick, 102 F.2d 305, 315 (1939). 
Armed with this language, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that since there was no 
evidence of any specific agreement covering the application of payments on the ex-
husband's debts or evidence that the ex-husband instructed the plaintiff to apply his 
payments to the part of his debt guaranteed by Yano, the Plaintiff was authorized to apply 
her ex-husband's payments in any manner she wished, even to Yano's detriment. Id. at 
149-150. The court then stated that general rule that "a third person who is secondarily 
liable on a debt, such as a guarantor . . . cannot control the application which either the 
debtor or the creditor makes of a payment, and neither the debtor nor the creditor need 
apply the payment in the manner most beneficial to such persons." Id at 150.l 
In Wyandotte Coal & Lime Co. v. Wyandotte Pav. & Constr. Co., 154 P. 1012 
(Kansas 1916), the plaintiff brought an action against a guarantor to recover for materials 
it had furnished. The plaintiff had contracts with two separate companies and claimed 
balances were due on both accounts. Id. at 1012. The guarantor demanded that one of 
1
 The Yano decision cites the Tenth Circuit's decision in Mid-Continent Supply 
Co. v. Atkins & Potter Drilling Corp., 229 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1956), wherein the court 
stated the general rule that where a creditor holds different obligations of a debtor, some 
of which are guaranteed by third-parties, unless otherwise directed by the debtor, the 
creditor may apply the proceeds of a payment made by the debtor to the obligation or 
obligations not guaranteed. 229 F.2d at 76 (emphasis added). 
Like Yano, Mid-Continent Supply Co. is inapposite to this case where Stanford is 
not seeking to direct application of payments made by Snowmass towards his guarantee; 
but rather, Stanford is seeking credit for payments he himself made as guarantor. 
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the payments made by one of the borrowers be applied to the other borrower's account. 
Id. Both the trial court and Kansas Supreme Court held that the guarantor had no right to 
dictate how the plaintiff applied payments it received where the appropriation of 
payments "belongs exclusively to the debtor and creditor, and a third party cannot be 
heard to complain of a different appropriation from that agreed upon by the debtor and 
creditor." id- at 1013. The Kansas Supreme Court also found important that the 
payments made to the plaintiff were not from the guarantor's account but rather the 
borrower's. Id 
Finally, in Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Copper Hills Motor Hotels, Inc., 424 P.2d 
154 (Ariz. 1967), a guarantor attempted to direct how a borrower's payments were 
applied by the lender. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment 
against the guarantor and noted that while a debtor may direct how his payment is 
applied, guarantors do not "have the right to control the application which either the 
debtor or the creditor makes of the payment." Id- at 156 quoting Valley NatT Bank v. 
Shumwav, 163 P.2d 676, 679 (Ariz. 1945). 
As set forth above, Yano, Wyandotte, and Standard Accident Ins. Co. each 
involved facts where a guarantor was attempting to intervene and direct how a borrower's 
payment was to be applied. None of those cases involved a guarantor seeking credit for 
payments which he himself had made to the lender. While it is true that in Yano, 
Wyandotte, and Standard Accident Ins. Co., each court held that a guarantor has no right 
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to dictate how a borrower's payment is applied, that general rule is inapplicable to this 
case since Stanford is not seeking credit for payments which Snowmass made, rather, he 
is seeking credit for payments which he himself made as guarantor. Stanford contends 
that based on that fact, neither Yano nor Wyandotte nor Standard Accident Ins. Co. is 
relevant to this issue on appeal. 
As set forth in Stanford's opening brief, the only case which is analogous to the 
present one is Monmouth Plumbing, wherein a guarantor's guarantee was a fixed amount, 
just like Stanford's was; where the borrower was unable to make his required payments, 
just like Snowmass was unable to do; where the lender made demand for payment upon 
the and the guarantor made payments to the lender with his own money in order to honor 
his personal guarantee, just like Stanford; where the guarantor made payments to the 
lender in excess of his maximum guarantee amount, just like Stanford did by paying the 
Parks over $750,000.00 when his guarantee was capped at $500,000.00 and where 
notwithstanding the payments the lender received from the guarantor, the lender still 
sought a judgment exceeding the guarantor's maximum guarantee amount, just like the 
Parks have done by seeking $500,000.00 from Stanford pursuant to his guarantee even 
though Stanford has already extinguished this guarantee amount. See Monmouth 
Plumbing. 147 A. at 627. 
The Parks attempt to minimize Monmouth's applicability by arguing that there was 
no evidence of a prior agreement to apply Stanford's payments a certain way. (Appellees' 
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Op. Br. at 16.) However, in Monmouth, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not rely on 
this fact, or even make mention, that there was no agreement between the lender and 
guarantor as to how payments would be applied. Likewise in this case, the issue is not 
whether there needed to be an agreement between the Parks and Snowmass as to how 
Snowmass' payments would be applied vis-a-vis Stanford. The issue is when a guarantor 
makes payments to the lender, should the lender give the guarantor credit for those 
payments towards his guarantee? The answer is yes. 
The District Court erroneously concluded that Stanford was not entitled to credit 
for the $750,000.00 in payments he made the made to the Parks pursuant to his guarantee 
and then held Stanford liable for an additional $900,000.00 of debt. (R. 391-392.) The 
Parks contend that the fact Stanford made payments to them rather than Snowmass is 
irrelevant based on the general rule that a guarantor cannot dictate how payments made by 
a debtor are applied. (Appellee's Op. Br. at 14-15.) However, as set forth above, that 
rule, along with the cases that recite it, are inapplicable here. Monmouth Plumbing is 
most analogous to this case and therefore its reasoning should be followed. 
Pursuant to the Monmouth Plumbing decision, the District Court should have 
given Stanford credit towards his guarantee for the payments he personally made to the 
Parks in fulfillment of his guarantee. Moreover, the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment on this issue was inappropriate where at the very least Stanford presented a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding credit for his payments. 
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B. The District Court Should Have Given Stanford Credit For His 
Payments To The Parks Where They Knew The Money They 
Received Was From Stanford 
The Parks cannot dispute the general rule that when a lender accepts a payment 
from a guarantor, and knows the funds come from the guarantor, the lender is required to 
apply that payment towards the guarantor's debt. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Inc. Co. v. 
Dakota Elec. Supply Co., 309 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1962); Central Blacktop v. Town of 
Cicero, 519 N.E.2d 972, 976 (Ill.App.Ct.5th Civ. 1988). In this case, Stanford 
demonstrated that once Snowmass missed its payments to the Parks, the Parks wrote 
Snowmass' guarantors, Stanford and Buckway, and demanded payment. (R. 205; 241-
261.) Stanford has also established that once contacted by the Parks for payment, he paid 
them in excess of $750,000.00 in satisfaction of his guarantee. (R. 160; 206; 263-280.) 
These facts are undisputed. 
In their opening brief, the Parks attempt to escape the aforementioned rule by 
arguing that there must be an "equitable exception" for that rule to apply. (Appellees' 
Op. Br. at 18.) The Parks also contend that notwithstanding Stanford's payments to them, 
he has not alleged that they actually knew those payments came from Stanford as a 
guarantor and not as an officer of Snowmass. (Appellees' Op. Br. at 18-19.) Both of 
these arguments fail legally and factually. 
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1. Stanford's payments to the Parks as a guarantor of 
Snowmass' loan constitutes an equitable consideration 
which requires that he be given credit for those payments 
An equitable exception does not need to be present to require a lender to apply a 
guarantor's payments towards his guarantee. The fact that a guarantor, rather than the 
borrower, makes a payment to the lender constitutes the equitable exception to the general 
rule that a guarantor may not control the application of a debtor's payment. 
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Inc. Co. v. Dakota Elec. Supply Co.. 309 F.2d 22 (8th 
Cir. 1962), the Eight Circuit was faced with a scenario where one debtor had two or more 
outstanding debts to one creditor. The debtor made a payment to the creditor and the 
question was whether the creditor properly applied that payment. Id. at 25. 
In its analysis, the Eight Circuit stated the general rule that when a borrower makes 
a payment, he may direct how it is applied if he manifests that intent to the lender before 
or at the time of payment. Id. The court noted that if the borrower fails to so indicate, the 
lender may apply the payment however she wants. Id. However, the Eight Circuit then 
noted that where the surety itself makes a payment to a lender, this fact constitutes an 
exception to these general rules, an exception which is founded on principles of 
"equitable considerations." Id- The court noted that another exception occurs where 
money which comes to the lender from the borrower comes from the guarantor and the 
lender knows the guarantor is the source. Id. 
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Consequently, in St. Paul Fire the Eight Circuit did not hold that there must be 
equitable circumstances to apply the rule that a lender must give a guarantor credit for 
payments he makes. Rather, the Eight Circuit held that the fact that a guarantor himself 
makes payments to a lender on behalf of a borrower is the equitable circumstance which 
justifies deviance from the general rules governing how a lender applies payments. 
Pursuant to the reasoning of the St Paul Fire court, the District Court erred by not giving 
Stanford credit for the payments he made to the Parks. 
The St. Paul Fire court also noted that when a borrower makes payments to a 
lender using a guarantor's funds, that constitutes an equitable consideration which calls 
for giving the guarantor credit for that payment. 309 F.2d at 25. In this case, Stanford 
would at times transfer his own personal funds into Snowmass' bank account so that 
Snowmass could make its monthly payment to the Parks. (R. 159.) Accordingly, 
Stanford should have received credit for those payments which Snowmass made using 
Stanford's money. 
The Parks' theory that there is no "equitable exception" to justify giving Stanford 
credit for the payments he made to the Parks fails where Stanford made payments to the 
Parks in his capacity as guarantor and where Stanford was also the source of funds which 
Snowmass used to pay the Parks. 
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2. Stanford has alleged that the Parks knew the payments they 
received came from him in his capacity as guarantor 
The Parks knew the payments they received from Stanford were based on his 
status as guarantor of Snowmass. The law is clear that when a lender knows the source of 
funds she receives is from a guarantor, the lender must give the guarantor credit for such 
payments. See United States v. Franchi Bros. Construction Corp., 378 F.2d 134, 139 (2d 
Cir. 1967)(stating that when a creditor knows the surety is the source of funds it receives 
from a debtor, the creditor must apply those funds to the guaranteed debt); Ash Grove 
Lime & Portland Cement Co. v. Moran Construction Co., 296 N.W. 761 (Neb. 1941) 
(holding that a lender must apply a debtor's payment to guaranteed debt if the lender 
knows that the guarantor is the source of those funds.) In this case, the facts demonstrate 
the Parks knew that Stanford was the source of over $750,000.00 in payments to them, 
and therefore the Parks should have given Stanford credit for those payments. 
Snowmass was often delinquent with its monthly payments to the Parks. (R. 1.) 
Once Snowmass was behind on its payments, Mr. Park would contact Stanford requesting 
that he honor his guarantee and make the payments on behalf of Snowmass. (R. 205; 
241-261.) The record contains twenty separate letters that Mr. Park wrote to Snowmass' 
guarantors, Stanford and Buckway, demanding immediate payments. (R. 241-261.) In 
each of those letters, Mr. Park addressed Stanford and Buckway who were the guarantors 
of the loan rather than Snowmass who was the obligor. (R. 241-261.) 
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While it is true that Mr. Park did not specifically address Stanford and Buckway as 
"guarantors" in his letters, the only conceivable reason he would address his letters to 
them personally, rather than to Snowmass, was to demand payment from them 
individually because they were the guarantors. The Parks' letters to Stanford and 
Buckway demanding payment is exactly the type of action one takes when an obligor has 
failed to make a payment, the creditor demands payment from the guarantors. 
Furthermore, when Stanford sent payments to the Parks he often did so using his 
personal checks, rather than checks drawn on Snowmass' bank account. (R. 270-273.) A 
few of the checks Stanford sent were cashier's checks which included the notation "Gary 
Stanford" on the check. (R. 274.) One of the cashier's checks made payable to Mr. Park 
had the notation "Snowmass Highland/ Dr. Stanford." (R. 275.) And one check just had 
the notation "Snowmass" on it. (R. 276.) These checks, none of which was drawn on a 
Snowmass account, weakens any argument the Parks have made that they had no idea that 
over $750,000.00 in payments came from Stanford as a guarantor. 
The fact that Mr. Park sent Stanford and Buckway a letter each time Snowmass 
was delinquent with its payment is evidence that the Parks were demanding payment from 
Stanford as a guarantor. The fact that Stanford sent money to the Parks using his own 
personal checks rather than Snowmass checks is evidence that the Parks knew Stanford 
was paying them as a guarantor. Stanford has also alleged that Mr. Park demanded that 
Stanford pay him based on Stanford's personal guarantee. (R. 205; 211-241.) The 
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cumulative effect of these facts is that the Parks knew the payments they received from 
Stanford came from him in his capacity as an individual guarantor, not on behalf of 
Snowmass. 
Where this Court must view "the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light 
most favorable" to Stanford, there is at the very least a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether the Parks did in fact know that Stanford was paying them as 
Snowmass' guarantor. See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, J^ 6, 177 P.3d 600. Given this 
genuine issue of fact, this Court may remand this case to the District Court with 
instructions to resolve this issue. 
n. STANFORD'S GUARANTEE AMOUNT IN THE JULY TRUST 
DEED IS AMBIGUOUS 
The District Court erred by awarding the Parks a judgment against Stanford which 
included $500,000.00 in principal and $508,463.91 in interest on that principal amount. 
The July Trust Deed purportedly sets Stanford's guarantee at $500,000.00, exclusive of 
interest and costs. (R. 4.) However, the July Trust Deed also incorporates previous 
instruments and documents which set Stanford's guarantee at a maximum of $500,000.00, 
inclusive of any interest and costs. These conflicting contract terms render the July Trust 
Deed ambiguous and should have precluded the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment. See Peterson v. The Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ^  14, 43 P.3d 918 (internal 
quotation omitted.) Furthermore, the District Court erred in awarding the Parks a 
judgment which is double what Stanford's maximum liability should have been. 
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The Parks contend that Stanford's guarantee in the July Trust Deed is not 
ambiguous because he was allegedly unaware of events surrounding the negotiation of the 
Snowmass REPC between October 1994 and July 1995. (Appellees' Op. Br. at 11-12.) 
While Stanford may not have been personally involved in every negotiation and 
amendment of the July Trust Deed's contract terms, Stanford made clear from the outset 
of this case that his guarantee was always to be set at a maximum amount of $500,000.00 
and the agreements incorporated into the July Trust Deed reflected that fact. (R. 154; 
201-202.) 
When Stanford was presented with an addendum to the Snowmass REPC in April 
of 1994, it included interlineations which purportedly increased Stanford's guarantee 
from $500,000.00 total to $500,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs. (R. 218-222.) 
Stanford did not agree to that change in his maximum guarantee amount. (R. 153-154.) 
In September of 1994, the Parks' attorney sent Stanford a letter which memorialized the 
REPC terms, and that letter corrected the April addendum by capping Stanford's 
guarantee amount at $500,000.00. (R. 226.) Moreover, on October 11, 1994, the Parks' 
attorney sent Stanford an agreement setting forth the REPC's essential terms which also 
provided that Stanford's "guarantee will be limited to a maximum liability of $500,000" 
without any mention of interest. (R. 230-231.) Later in October, the Parks' attorney sent 
Stanford another agreement which reilerated that while Stanford would personally 
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guarantee the July Trust Deed, his guarantee "will be limited to a maximum liability of 
$500,000." (R. 233-235.) 
Accordingly, all of the relevant documents between the REPC addendum in April 
of 1994 and the July Trust Deed itself, state unequivocally that Stanford would carry a 
maximum liability of $500,000.00. Each of these documents was incorporated into the 
July Trust Deed, a deed which suddenly included interest and costs in addition to the 
agreed upon $500,000.00 amount. Stanford contends that the guarantee amount's 
discrepancy constitutes an ambiguity which should have precluded summary judgment in 
the court below. 
The Parks argue that the September 1994 letter, October 11, 1994 letter, and 
October 24, 1994 letter should not be deemed incorporated into the July Trust Deed 
because they are not "instruments." (Appellees' Op. Br. at 12-13.) However, this 
argument is contradicted by the documents themselves. Both the October 11, 1994, letter 
and October 24, 1994, letter include signature lines for Stanford and Buckway. (R. at 
221; 225.) In the case of the October 24, 1994, letter, all of the parties signed and dated 
the contract terms set forth in that letter. (R. 235.) The inclusion of these date and 
signature lines, as well as the parties' signatures, demonstrates that these "letters" were 
legal documents which once executed carried the legal ramifications of a binding 
contract. The fact that these instruments were couched as letters does not change their 
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character or legal import. These documents were legal instruments as contemplated by 
the July Trust Deed and are therefore incorporated as part of the July Trust Deed. 
Additionally, the July Trust Deed does not contain an integration or merger clause 
as the Parks' suggest, but rather an incorporation clause. Accordingly, the October 11 & 
24, 1994, letters are not replaced, superseded, or extinguished by the July Trust Deed but 
rather made a part of the Deed. Had the July Trust Deed expressly superseded those prior 
instruments as in the case of Ford v. American Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2004 UT 70, j^ 
27, 98 P.2d 15, then the Parks' argument would be more tenable. However, the July Trust 
Deed's language does not provide that it supersedes all prior agreements but states that it 
merely incorporates them in full. (R. 4.) 
The Parks rely on the case of Daines v. Vincent 2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269, in 
support of their argument that the July Trust Deed supersedes the previous agreements. 
(Appellees' Op. Br. at 13, n.l.) In Daines, however, the integration clause stated that 
u[t]his release encompasses and satisfies any prior agreements and discussion whether 
written or verbal." 2008 UT 51, f 23. In this case, the July Trust Deed does not purport 
to "satisfy" or supersede any of the previous agreements. Instead, the July Trust Deed 
merely incorporates and makes them part of the Deed. The July Trust Deed's 
incorporation clause expands the Deed's terms rather than narrowing them. The Parks' 
reliance on Daines to support their contention that the July Trust Deed supersedes the 
previous agreements is misplaced. 
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As set forth above, the amount of Stanford's guarantee is ambiguous at best. 
While the July Trust Deed sets his guarantee at $500,000.00 exclusive of interest and 
costs, the previous contracts entered into by the parties and incorporated into the Deed 
clearly limited Stanford's liability to $500,000.00. Moreover, the July Trust Deed does 
not contain an integration or merger clause which would have satisfied or superseded the 
previous agreements which limited Stanford's guarantee liability. Stanford contends that 
the District Court erred in awarding the Parks a judgment in excess of Stanford's 
$500,000.00 guarantee and this Court should vacate the judgment. 
ffl. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE GIVEN STANFORD AN 
OFFSET FOR THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MARKET 
VALUE OF THE OGDEN PROPERTY AND ITS SALE PRICE 
Notwithstanding the Parks' assertion to the contrary, they are the owners of the 
Ogden Property and purchased that property at a trustee's sale. (R. 154; 214; Add. Ex. 
C.) The Parks contend that the Bank of Utah was actually the purchaser of the Ogden 
Property. However, this argument is contradicted by the facts in the record. 
The Notice of Trustee's Sale states that the Ogden Property was for sale by virtue 
of Snowmass' default. (Add. Ex. A, Appellees' Add. Ex. C.) The Notice provides that 
sale was conducted pursuant to the foreclosure of a Trust Deed dated March 12, 1992, 
executed by Mr. Park as trustor. (Id.) Snowmass' default on its payments of the Ogden 
Property was the obligation which Stanford guaranteed. Accordingly, the Parks' 
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argument that Security Mutual foreclosed the Ogden Property based on an obligation not 
guaranteed by Stanford is erroneous. 
Moreover, even if the Bank of Utah submitted the credit bid on the Ogden 
Property at the foreclosure sale, it purchased the Property for and on behalf of the Parks. 
The Parks concede that the Bank of Utah purchased the Ogden Property as "Custodian of 
the Kang S. Park IRA." (Appellees' Op. Br. at 23.) Accordingly, in law and equity the 
Parks as beneficiaries of the Kang S. Park I.R.A. were the purchasers and are the owners 
of the Ogden Property and their deficiency judgment should have been reduced by the fair 
market value of the Ogden Property at the time of its sale. 
The law in Utah is clear that a lender must credit the fair market value of a 
property at the time of its sale to offset any alleged deficiency claim. See U.C.A. § 57-1-
32 (2008). The reasoning behind this rule is to eliminate the possibility of a judgment 
creditor's double recovery by not only obtaining a deficiency judgment but also ending up 
with equity in the property as well. See Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 
1995). The Parks have not, nor can they, dispute that Surety Life extends the protections 
of U.C.A. § 57-1-32 to guarantors and therefore those protections apply in this case. 
§ 57-1-32, as extended by Surety Life, was crafted to protect against the very 
situation which has transpired in this case. Snowmass defaulted on its obligation to 
Security Mutual, an obligation which Stanford had guaranteed and assumed from the 
Parks. (R. 154; 214; Add. Ex. C.) The Parks purchased the Security Mutual Note back 
18 
with the intention of foreclosing the Note and regaining possession of the Ogden 
Property. (R. 616.) The Parks sold the Ogden Property and regained possession of the 
Property by directing the Bank of Utah to purchase it for them at a foreclosure sale for a 
credit bid of $200,000.00. (R. 430-431; Add. Ex. B; Appellees' Statement of Facts at t 
13.) The Parks have admitted that at the time of the sale, the Ogden Property had a fair 
market value of at least $425,00.00. (R. 430-431.) Accordingly, the Parks' judgment 
should be reduced by at least $225,000.00 and the District Court erred by failing to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Stanford respectfully ask this Court to vacate the district 
court's Judgment and remand the case to the district court for proceedings consistent with 
its order. 
DATED this / ? * day of February, 2009. 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
Russell ShWalker 
Reid W. Ainbet 
Anthony M. Grover 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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